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ince the onset ofthe international debt crisis, various new schemes and
innovative financial arrangements have been proposed for the purpose
of alleviating the external debt problems currently experienced by
many developing countries [The World Bank, 1985]. Common to many of
these proposals is the intent to alter the external capital structure of
developing countries toward increasing the proportion of claims based on
some form of risk and profit sharing (Le., equity participation). This applies,
for example, to recent measures designed to promote foreign direct invest-
ments (such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency), debt-equity
swap arrangements (introduced in Chile), the promotion of mutual funds
containing stocks of developing country industries (such as the I(orean
Fund), and contingency arrangements, such as commodity-linked bonds, with
clauses that index their returns to the price of key commodities exported by
the borrower (recent debt renegotiations involving Mexico and Venezuela
included such clauses).
A shift in the external capital structure, as projected by these measures,
yields the obvious benefit of reducing the extremely heavy debt-service
burden of some developing countries. From a broader welfare perspective,
however, can itbe claimed thata developing countrywould bebetter offwith
a lower external debt-equityratio? This question has recentlybeen addressed
in terms of a choice-theoretic model based on an agent-principal approach
[Lächler, 1985]. That analysis arrived at the familiar result that both a
first-best "cooperative" or a second-best "non-cooperative" equilibrium are
possible outcomes of the capital transfer negotiations between foreign
principals and the managing authorities of a developing country. Itwas then
shown that if conditions conducive to a cooperative equilibrium pertain, a
shift from debt financed to equity financed transfers, leaving the total capital
inflow the same, would yield an unambiguous welfare improvement from the
viewpoint of the capital importing nation. With a non-cooperative environ-632 Ulrich Lächler and Peter Nunnenkamp
ment, however, the answer to the question posed above is less clear-cut. In
that case, the choicebetween equityordebtfinanced inflows canbeshownto
involve a "risk-return" tradeoff between income stability and expected
growth. That is, with a higher proportion of equity financed inflows, the
variability of residual income generated and retained in the developing
economy would decline, but the domestic savings incentives and hence the
future growth prospects of that economy would also be reduced.
In view ofthese conclusions, it is of considerable interest for the purpose
of formulating policy recommendations to determine whether the actual
environment in which capital transfers to developing countries take place is
more accurately characterized by a cooperative or non-cooperative process.
This essay provides some evidence on this issue, using data from a sampie of
36 developing countries overthe period 1976-1979. Cross-countryregression
analyses are applied to test several competing hypotheses concerning the
domestic savings and growth response of developing nations to alternative
sources of capital inflows. These hypotheses are explicitly derived from the
agent-principal model mentioned previously, and to be discussed next.
11. A Discussion of tbe Basic Model
The theoretical framework employed originates from the literature that
focuses on agency relationships, or moral hazard problems, arising from the
separation of ownership and control of the firm when monitoring costs are
non-negligible [e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1977; Stiglitz, 1974]. In
contrast to the traditional profit-maximizing postulate, this literature builds
on the assumption that the incentive structure governing the behaviour of
decision-makers in a firm varies with the rules that determine how the
proceeds from that firm are distributed. Since those rules are intimately
connected to the firm's financial structure, a change in the debt-equity ratio,
for example, is likely to affect thefirm's performance. Withthis approach, the
Modigliani-MillerTheorem holds only as a special case, whenvarious market
imperfections are removed.
Several authors have adopted a similar approach to explain different
aspects of the international credit market, with an emphasis on the debt-
related problems ofdeveloping countries [Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Folkerts-
Landau, 1985; Sachs, 1982]. In this context, the decision-making authorities
of a capital-recipient country can be visualized as agents in an economic
enterprise vis-a-vis foreign principals. Lächler [1985] has extended this work
by developing a choice-theoretic model that simultaneously incorporates
bothequityand debt instruments as alternative sources offoreign capital. The
basic assumptions made in that model are:
(i) Aggregate future output ofa small developing economyis a function of
current investment and an exogenous random element, whose value isDebt versus Equity Inflows 633
realized after the investment decision has taken place.
(ii) The aggregate investment decision is madeby a social planner,character-
ized as a risk-averse agent maximizing a well-behaved social expected utility
function with domestic consumption as its argument.
(iii) Foreign capital owners supplying external funds are modelled as
rational risk-neutral principals, who are indifferent to whether a capital
transfer takes place in the form of debt or equity participation as long as the
expected return on both claims is the same. From their viewpoint, the claims
on this economy represent only one of many investment opportunities in a
diversified asset portfolio.
(iv) Foreign capital inflows are perfecdy "fungible", whether they appear in
the form of debt, equity or foreign aid (treated here as an unrequited gift). In
otherwords, once a transfer ofcapital has taken place, the agent obtains total
control in disposing of these funds for current investment or consumption
purposes1•
In this stylized setting, a moral hazard situation arises once a transfer of
capital has occurred. This situation is due to an informational asymmetry:
The principal, unlike the agent, does not know how much is effectively
invested after the capital transfer has taken place. All he observes is the level
of output generated in the future, which is only partly a function of
investment and in part stochastic. That rules out the possibility of setting up
contingency contracts, that link the terms of transfer to the ex post level of
investment undertaken [see, e.g. Haque and Mirakhor, 1986]. Consequently,
the following disincentive problems emerge: Ifthe transfer takes place in the
form of equity participation, entitling the principal to a pre-negotiated share
offuture output, the agent has an ex postincentive to invest a smaller portion
of the currently available funds (and hence consume more) than if the same
transfer had been made as a gift. Alternatively, if the transfer is made in
exchange for debt claims entitling the principal to a fixed sum in the future,
then in making his investment decision, the agent has an ex post incentive to
accept more risk than in the case of a gift-transfer, which translates into a
greater intertemporal variability of domestic consumption. Both types of
behaviour onthe partoftheagentwould, ceteris paribus, reduce the expected
value of claims held by the principal. Rational principals, however, would
anticipate suchbehaviourbefore effectingthetransfer, and demand commen-
surate adjustments in the terms and conditions atwhich the transfer is made.
A cooperative outcome ofthis transfer process is conceivable if the agent
"cooperates" with the principals and complies with all previously negotiated
commitments, including the amount of investment to be undertaken, in spite
1 The basic equations of the model that correspond to these assumptions are provided in the
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of the disincentives noted above. Perhaps more realistically, this outcome
couldbe achieved ifthe principal had the ability to monitorthe agent directly
or to impose penalties on the agent for not responding in this cooperative
manner. That would eliminate the moral hazard problem. However, if the
costs of monitoring are sufficiently high, due to information barriers or
limited legal enforcement capabilities, only a non-cooperative outcome may
be feasible, which generally leaves the agent in a less favourable position
relative to the hypothetical cooperative outcome.
Since it is difficult to say, apriori, whether the transfer negotiations are
more likely to converge to a cooperative or non-cooperative equilibrium,
bothsolutionswere investigated, yieldingthebasic conclusions: ina coopera-
tive environment the risk-averse agent would always prefer equity over debt
financed inflows, while in a non-cooperative environment he would choose
same optimal combination of both types of claims, corresponding to a
preferred point on an implicit trade-off between domestic income variability
and expected future consumption. On the basis ofthis conclusion alone one
might infer that a non-cooperative equilibrium is more representative of
actualtransfer processes, since most countries usuallyreceive foreign loansas
weH as direct investments. This outcome, however, could justas easily be due
to the fact that those countries have faced supply-constraints in terms ofthe
types of transfers made available by foreign principals.
A stronger and more interesting set of competing hypotheses emerges
when both equilibria are subjected to a comparative statics analysis. This
was done in Lächler [1985, Section 5] to derive the equilibrium investment
response to a foreign capital inflow from alternative sources. The results
reveal an important difference: In a non-cooperative environment, the
equilibrium change in aggregate investment, I, resulting from an increase in
foreign transfers, T, obeys the following pattern:
(1) dI/dTIEquity ~ dI/dTIAid ~ dI/dTIDebt
and 0 ~ dI/dTIAid ~ 1. Aid, once again, is simply considered as a gift that
raises the initial endowrnent of the capital recipient. Here it turns out that
dI/dTIEquity may be negative, while dI/dTIDebt is always positive.
On the other hand, in a cooperative environment the following pattern
results:
(2) dI/dTIAid ~ (dI/dTIEquity' dI/dTIDebt)
such that, also 0 ~ dI/dTIAid ~ 1. Expression (2) states that in a cooperative
situation the agent would always invest more in response to transfers
entailing future repayment obligations, be they in the form of equity or debt,
than in response to a gift. In this case, it remains indeterminate whether
dI/dTIEquity ~ dI/dTIOebt, since that depends, among otherthings, on the initialDebt versus Equity Inflows 635
level of outstanding obligations2•
A corollary of this result is that domestic savings and output growth
should exhibit the same order of response behaviour in respective environ-
ments. That is because domestic savings, S, are defined as total minus foreign
savings, 1-T, so that dSIdT = dlldT-1. The only necessary modification to be
made in expressions (1) and (2) is thatthe expected response to an aid inflow
would then be bounded by -1 ~ dS/dTIAid ~ O. Similarly, on the assumption
that a nation's growth rate is positively related to the amount of investment,
the same pattern of growth responses to foreign inflows as described by the
preceding expressions should result. Durpurpose next is to devise some tests
that may help us to discriminate which of the two patterns given by
expressions (1) and (2) best characterizes actual transfer processes.
III. Equation Specification and Statement of Hypotheses
The basic equation to be estimated below using cross-country data is of
the form:
(3) Xi = ao+ a1(FDI/GDP)i + a2(AID/GDP)i + a3(DEBT/GDP)i
The exogenous variables on the right-hand side of this expression represent
the netforeign capital inflows per annum received by countryiin the form of
foreign direct investment, aid, and through debt-related channels, each
expressed as a share of GOP. The proxies used for these variables are
discussed later. Suffice it to note here that FDI represents our measure of
foreign capital introduced in the form of equity participation.
Three variables are used separately for the endogenous variable, Xi. These
are (i) the domestic savings rate, OSR, also expressed in shares of GDP, (ii)
the aggregate investment rate, IR, and (iii) the annual per capita growth rate
of GOP, denoted GR3. :
Dur hypothesis is that capital transfers to developing countries are best
described by a non-cooperative process. From expression (1), we would
therefore expect to obtain coefficient estimates in (3) that obey the following
pattern:
(4) a1 ~ a2 ~ a3
Furthermore, with regard to the individual coefficient estimates, the theory
states that these should satisfy the following constraints:
2 It also turns out that, for any given level of foreign debt or equity financed transfers, the
equilibrium level of investment undertaken by the agent is always greater in a cooperative
environment than in a non-cooperative one.
3 Additional regressions were also performed with the annual growth rate of GDP (unadjusted
for population growth) instead ofGRasthe dependentvariable. Since no significant difference inthe
estimation and hypothesis-test results emerged, we do not report those additional results.636 Ulrich Lächler and Peter Nunnenkamp
(5) a) -1 ~ a2 ~ 0, when the endogenous variable is DSR,
b) ° ~ a2 ~ 1, when the endogenous variable is IR,
c) a2 ~ 0, when the endogenous variable is GR,
d) a3 ~ 0, when the endogenous variable is IR or GR.
Our first step, then is to see whether any of these constraints can be
statistically rejected.
Ourprimary concern, however, is less with the absolute size ofthe individual
coefficients. For purposes oftheoryvalidation, it is their relative size thatis of
main interest. With that focus in mind, we can set up the alternative
hypothesis, proposing that there is no significant difference in the responses
to the various forms of capital inflows. This alternative hypothesis may be
supported or rejected by testing the simultaneous constraint:
(6) a1 = a2 = a3
Continuing alongthese lines, we can proceedto make pair-wise comparisons,
and examine whether the data permits us to reject the following restrictions:
(7) a) a2 = a3
b) a1 = a3
c) a1 = a2
Itis importantto note here thatthe crucial testfor supporting orrejecting the
assumption of a non-cooperative environment against the alternative, that a
cooperative environment applies, concerns restriction (7.c). By comparing
expressions (1) and (2), we observe that in both cases it would be predicted
that a3 ~a 2, and further, that it is left indeterrninate whether a3 ~ a1 in a
cooperative environment. What is clear, however, is that in a cooperative
environment we would observe that a1 ~ ~, while in the non-cooperative
environment, a1 ~ a2•
Having performed these tests, two further issues are addressed below.
Since the coefficient estimates are made by ordinary least square methods, it
is necessary to discuss the simultaneity biases that might be involved in this
procedure. The other issue concerns the sampIe homogeneity. Is it possible
that in some developing countries a cooperative relationship with foreign
principals has developed, but not in others? This question is examined by
performing separate analyses for "problem" countries that encountered
debt-servicing difficulties during, or shortly after, the relevant sampIe period,
and for the remaining countries.
The impact offoreign inflows on domestic savings and growth has been a
subject of controversy for many years in the development literature. This has
led to a substantial body ofempirical research (as surveyed, e.g., in BhagwatiDebt versus Equity Inflows 637
[1978]), some ofwhich bears a resemblance to the regressions reported here.
Much of this work, however, is mainly concerned with the effectiveness of
foreign aid. One major bone of contention is whether aid raises total domestic
investment by an equal amount, as assumed in early applied development
models [Chenery and Strout, 1966; Leontief, 1965]; or is fungible enough to
be treated as a general increment to income [Mosley, 1980; Papanek, 1972;
Weisskopf, 1974]; or it is downright deleterious, for various socio-political
reasons, as argued in Griffin and Enos [1970]. While various attempts were
also made to differentiate between alternative sources offoreign inflows, such
as private versus official inflows [e.g., Papanek, 1973; Dowling and Hiemenz,
1983], none have addressed the central equity-versus-debt distinction em-
phasized in this essay. Another contrast with most earlier research emerges
from the fact that the estimated coefficient values in (3) by themselves reveal
little about whether a developing country is better off receiving one form of
inflow or another. To arrive at such welfare conclusions it is necessary to
place the regression estimates in a specific choice-theoretic context, such as
we have described earlier. Previous related empirical studies have generally
not provided such an explicit context.
IV. Tbe Empirical Results
1. The Data Base - Some Explanatory Remarks
To perform our cross-country analysis, we began with an initial sampie of
about 50 developing economies, for which the required data was available.
This sampie was then reduced to 36 countries by eliminating those that
reported net financial outflows of direct investment, debt or development aid
for the entire period, 1976-1979. Since our study concerns the impact of
foreign financial inflows on economic performance, this sampie restriction
seems appropriate; (see Weisskopf [1974], who employs a similar procedure).
The databasefor these 36 countries is presented inTable Al oftheAppendix,
along with an explanation of the sources and definitions of the specific
variables. We added all flows within each category over the period 1976-1979,
so thatthe sampie points reported in Table Al represent period aggregates or
averages. This sampie, though considerably reduced, still covers a wide
spectrum of developing economies in terms of income levels, economic
performance, overall dependence on foreign resource inflows, and the
structure of capital imports.
Before presenting the regression results, it is necessary to explain why the
analysis is restricted to the period 1976-1979. To begin, comparable time
series onthe structure ofnetcapital imports were notavailable until1976. On
the other hand, statistical information on most of our variables was available
up to 1984, except for domestic savings. Nevertheless, we decided to
concentrate on the second half of the 1970s because thereafter both the638 Ulrich Lächler and Peter Nunnenkamp
volume and structure of international capital transfers to developing coun-
tries were significantly affected by severe economic shocks: At the turn ofthe
decade, the second oil price shock induced a new round of enormous
financial recycling of 0 PEe surpluses, which drastically altered the previous
pattern of financial flows of the late 1970s. This was followed in the early
1980s by another shock to the international capital markets. With the
eruption of severe repayment crises in some important debtor countries,
Western commercial banks abruptly halted the provision of fresh money to
the problem-ridden Latin American region. That also altered the flows to
developing countries, both in terms of regional distribution and structural
composition. To avoid statistical noise on this account, we chose 1979 as the
endpoint date. To assess the robustness of our primary results, however, we
repeated the main regressions extending the endpoint date to 1981 (Le., after
the oil shockoccurred, butbefore Mexico suspended payments, triggering the
debt crisis). It turns out thatthis modification has little impact on the pattern
of estimated coefficients, but does affect their significance levels in some
cases. These results are reported in a footnote.
Table 1 reports the correlation coefficients between all variables used in
the subsequent r.egression analyses. In view of the fairly small correlation
between the independent variables, we should not expect any serious
multicollinearity problems to arise.
Table 1 - Correlation among Savings, Investment, Growth and Foreign
Resource Inflows (1976-1979)
DSR IR GR FDI/GDP AID/GDP DEBT/GDP
Domestic saving rate 1 0.72 0.41 -0.06 -0.49 0.45
Investment rate ... 1 0.18 -0.05 -0.20 0.61
Growth rate/capita 1 -0.45 -0.24 -0.03
Foreign direct
investment/GDP .. 1 -0.09 0.12




The coefficient estimates obtained from the regressions described by (3)
are presented in Table 2. The most remarkable feature ofthese results is that
in all cases the estimated coefficient values clearly follow the characteristic
pattern of a non-cooperative equilibrium, Le., ä1< äz< ä3• We also observe
that none ofthe conditions implied by our hypothesis, and outlined earlier inDebt versus Equity Inflows 639
expressions (5.a)-(5.d), can be rejected with much confidence. Although the
point estimates of a2 in regressions (2) and (3) of Table 2 violate conditions
(5.b) and (5.c), this deviation from the predicted range is notsignificant atthe
5 per centlevel4•We can conclude from these results thatthe basic behavioural
responses suggested by our model, along with the hypothesis that capital
transfers take place in a non-cooperative environment, are notrejected bythe
empirical evidence5.
Table 2 - Regression Results tor Equation (3) - All Countries, 1976-1979
Endogenous (FDI/GDP) (AID/GDP) (DEBT/GDP) F-Sta-
variable ao ä1 a 2 a 3 R2 R 2 tistic SSR
1. DSR .. 16.60 -2.51 -0.99 1.63 0.44 0.38 8.29 993
(1.87) (2.16) (0.28) (0.51)
2. IR .... 19.20 -1.74 -0.30 1.95 0.41 0.36 7.27 712
(1.63) (1.86) (0.24) (0.44)
3. GR ... 4.26 -2.89 -0.23 0.002 0.28 0.21 4.15 184
(0.81) (0.93) (0.12) (0.22)
Note: Terms in parentheses are standard errors. See text for definitions. Eqs. (1) and (3)
were estimated with a sampie of 36 countries, (2) with a sampie of 35 (data on IR
was not available for Nepal). All estimations were made by aLS.
4 Notice that the regressions with DSR and IR in Table 2 exhibit a higher R2 than that one with
GR as dependent variable. This observation can also be given an interpretation which is consistent
with our theoretical model: Recall that the basic theory concerns the determination of investment,
while changes in output are necessarily a stochastic function of investment. Hence, even if our
empirical model could perfectly explain all variations of IR (Le., with an R2 of 1), we should still
expect a less than perfeetfit in the case of GR. Onthe otherhand, there could be measurementerrors
which may offset the statement just made. That is, the observed values of IR and DSR may not
correspond to true investment, in the sense offoregone present consumption to raise future expected
output. The empirical distinction between investment and consumption is largely a matter of
convention. Thus, the label of investment gets attached to various consumption activities (per-
quisites) by management and to white elephant projects mainly designed to enhance the glory of
some transient politicians, while other more productive expenditures (on cars, for example) are
mislabeled consumption. This problem should not arise in the case of growth figures, since output
changes presumably reflect true investment activities, independent of how they are labeled.
5 Performing the same aLS regressions shown in Table 2, but using data for the extended period
1976-1981, yields the following results (standard errors in parentheses):
DSR = 15.43 - 1.31 FDIIGDP - 1.24 AID/GDP + 2.38 DEBT/GDP
(1.87) (2.21) (0.29) (0.68)
R:2 = 0.46 F = 10.48 SSR = 817 34 observations
IR = 19.74 - 2.36 FDIIGDP - 0.66 AID/GDP+ 2.49 DEBT/GDP
(1.30) (1.52) (0.21) (0.45)
R:2 = 0.53 F = 12.84 SSR = 359 32 observations640 Ulrich Lächler and Peter Nunnenkamp
.. . ..., ~
The next logical step, in view of this outcome, is to examine whether any
alternative hypotheses can be rejected. This is done by testing the parameter
restrictions described in expressions (6) and (7.a)-(7.c). Toward thatpurpose,
we use a standard F-test procedure of estimating the restricted form of
regression equation (3) and comparingthe resulting sum ofsquared residuals
with those obtained from the unrestricted estimations, presented in Table 2.
Table 3 reports these test results. From the first column of F-statistics we
observe that the alternative hypothesis, which claims that all forms of
external finance are alike in their impact on economic performance, is
unanimously rejected. In other words, there does appear to be a significant
difference in the savings and growth response to alternative sources of
finance. With regard to the other (pair-wise) constraint tests, the results are
not quite as convincing. We may note, however, that each of the restrictions,
(7.a)- (7.c), is rejected at least once in the relevant series of tests.
As argued earlier, the test ofrestriction (7.c) is the decisive one in terms of
pitting the non-cooperative hypothesis against the cooperative counterhypo-
thesis. Given that the previous estimations yielded ä1<ä2, a rejection of the
Table 3 - Constraint Tests
Endogenous Parameter restrietions
variable a1= a2 = a3 a2 = a3 a1= a3 a1= a2
DSR ......
SSR = 1674 SSR = 1671 SSR = 1096 SSR = 1009
F(3,32) = 7.3::: F(1,32) = 21.9* F(1,32) = 3.31 F(1,32) = 0.52
IR ........
SSR = 1198 SSR = 1193 SSR = 794 SSR = 726
F(3,31) = 6.7* F(1,31) = 20.9* F(1,31) = 3.6 F(1,31) = 0.61
GR .......
SSR = 235 SSR = 188 SSR = 235 SSR = 234
F(3,32) = 3.0* F(1,32) = 0.7 F(1,32) = 8.9* F(1,32) = 8.7*
Note: SSR denotes the sum of squared residuals obtained by estimating (3) with the
respective constraints imposed. These values are then compared with the SSR of the un-
constrained estimations, reported in Table 2, to derive the F-statistic values here. A*indicates
that the parameter restriction can be rejected at the 5 per cent significance level.
GR = 3.11 - 1.85 FDIIGDP - 0.19 AID/GDP+ 0.07 DEBT/GDP
(0.93) (1.10) (0.15) (0.32)
R:2 = 0.04 F = 1.42 SSR = 203 34 observations
These coefficient estimates display the same qualitative pattern as those in Table 2. There are some
differences, however, in terms of the statistical significance of the estimated values. Most notable is
the decline in the explanatory power ofthe last equation, involving GRasthe dependentvariable äi2
= 0.04). This decline may be attributed to the increased economic turbulence experienced in
1980'-1981, when additional factors, ignored in this analysis, attain greater importance in determin-
ing growth patterns. The other major difference is that the AID/GDP coefficient in the second
equation, involving IR as the dependentvariable, nowturns outto be significantly negative, contrary
to what was hypothesized. This may be due to simultaneity bias, which we address later.Debt versus Equity Inflows " 641
constraint, a1= a2, is sufficientfor rejecting the cooperative hypothesis, which
states that a1 ~ a2• From the last column of Table 3 we observe that while
restriction (7.c) cannot be rejected when DSR and IR are used as dependent
variables in the regression equations, it is rejected when GR is employed.
3. Simultaneous Equation Problems
By and large, the results obtained so far support our hypothesis. But since
the estimation technique we used involves single-equation ordinary least
squares, some doubt is bound to arise with regard to the unbiasedness ofthe
estimated coefficients. Such doubt has been frequently voiced in criticism of
similar studies addressing the effectiveness of foreign aid [e.g., Over, 1975;
Papanek, 1972]. The main thrust of these critiques is that domestic savings
andgrowth are notonly determined bythe amountofforeign aid inflows, but,
in turn, they also determine how much aid flows in. Consequently, AID .
would not be fully exogenous in (3), which violates the orthogonality
principle and leads to biased estimates.
With respect to the two-way causation argument between AID and
domestic savings or growth, an underlying premise is that foreign assistance
is largely given (for altruistic reasons) to countries in need. That by itself,
however, is not enough to generate biased estimates. A further necessary
assumption for thatresult is that "needy" countries are more likely to exhibit
lower savings (or growth) rates. Should that assumption be valid, then the
estimated relation between aid and savings or growth will reflect both the
response of aid recipients and the motives of aid donors.
To accountfor the possibility oftwo-way causation in the case·ofAID, we
reestimated (3) using a two stage, instrumental variable technique, such that
DEBT/GDP, FDI/GDP and GDP/capita were specified as the exogenous
instruments. In spite ofthis adjustment, all three regressions yielded the same
basic results as were obtained by OLS. The 2SLS regression involving GR
provides a representative example:
(8) GR=3.79 - 2.81 (FDI/GDP) - 0.11 (AID/GDP)·+ 0.02 (DEBT/GDP)
(1.52) (0.96) (0.35) (0.23)
SSR = 190 (standard errors in parentheses)
By comparingthis result with the third regression inTable 2, we note. thatthe
relative order of the estimated coefficients is the same in both cases. That is,
ä1<ä2 < ä3, as hypothesized for a non-cooperative environment.
The two-way causality argument applied to AID is much less plausible in
the case of FDI and DEBT inflows. Consequently, we did not attempt to
explore this possibility further6• If the negative coefficients obtained for
6 Contrary to foreign aid, a convincing theoretical argument referring to the simultaneous
equation problem in the case of FDI and DEBT does not exist to our knowledge. Therefore, the
choice of instrumental variables would be entirely arbitrary.642 Ulrich Lächler and Peter Nunnenkamp
(FDI/GDP) in ourprevious regressions aretobeblamed on simultaneitybias,
the logieal corollary would have to be that FDI (but not DEBT) is systemati-
eally channeled to low-saving or slow-growing eeonomies. It is difficult to
find a persuasive argument to justify this type of behaviour among foreign
eapital owners.
4. Sampie Homogeneity
When some firms, or countries, go bankrupt or eneounter debt-servicing
problems, and others do not, it is difficult to say, offhand, whether this
outcome is simply due to random draws offate or also to different patterns of
eonduet among the relevant decision-makers. One reason for supposing the
latter is thatsome agents may have developed a eooperative relationship with
their outside prineipals, while others remained in a non-eooperative rela-
tionship. One resultto emerge from the earlier theoretieal considerationswas
that the level of investment undertaken in response to a debt-finaneed
transfer is always less in a non-eooperative equilibrium than in a eooperative
one. At the same time, the terms of a transfer (e.g., interest rate) are always
less favourable for the eapital reeipient in a non-cooperative environment
relative to a eooperative environment. Le., the agentbearsthe agency costs of
finanee. Consequently, the likelihood th~t a borrower would run into
debt-servieing difficulties is always higher in a non-eooperative environment.
To investigate this issue, we separated our eross-country data into two
subsampies on the basis of whether or not a country was engaged in
multilateral debt renegotiations during the period 1975-1984, as stated in the
World Development Report [1985, Fig. 2.4A]. Assuming that some countries
developed a eooperative relationship while others did not, we would expeet
the former to be more highly eoneentrated among the eountries that did not
experience debt-servicing poblems. Separate regressions of (3) were then
performed over each subsampie, to see if any difference in the pattern of
responses emerged. When DSR and IRwere used as dependentvariables, the
separate estimation results (not shown here) were both fairly elose to those
obtained from the combined sampie regressions, shown in Table 2. This was
also reflected in the F-tests, whieh compare the SSR's from both subsampie
regressions to the respective (constrained) SSR's in Table 2. In the case of
DSR, F(4,28) = 1.65, and in the ease of IR, F(4,27) = 0.95. Both are
insignifieant.
In the ease of GR as the dependent variable, however, we obtain an
F-statistic value of F(4,28) = 3.22, which is signifieant atthe 5 per cent level.
The subsampie regressions that yield this result are (standard errors in
parentheses):Debt versus Equity Inflows 643
(i) Countries that renegotiated (n = 17)
(9) GR=3.98 - 2.30 (FDI/GDP) - 0.68 (AID/GDP) + 0.06 (DEBT/GDP)
(0.98) (0.84) (0.25) (0.37)
R2 = 0.58 R2 = 0.48 SSR = 53 F(3,13) = 6.0
(ii) Countries that did not renegotiate (n = 19)
(10) GR=4.08 +3.46 (FDI/GDP) - 0.18 (AID/GDP) + 0.03 (DEBT/GDP)
(1.20) (4.51) (0.14) (0.25)
R2 = 0.18 R2 = 0.01 SSR = 74 F(3,15) = 1.07
From (9), we observe that the countries encountering debt-servicing
difficulties exhibit the typical response pattern characteristic of a non-
cooperative environment. Furthermore, the overall R2 of the regression is
quite high. Anoticeable contrastemerges in the case of countries thatdid not
renegotiate. In (10), the estimated coefficient values obey a pattern that is
more consistent with a cooperative environment, giving some support to the
notion that a different transfer relationship, involving different response
patterns, may have developed in some countries. With thatinterpretation, the
low R2 ofregression (10) is to be expected, since the data sampIe in question
contains a more heterogenous group of countries, in terms ofcooperative and
non-cooperative behaviour, than the sampIe used for regression (9)7.
v. Conclusions
We propose that our preceding estimation results be interpreted within a
specific choice-theoretic context. That context was provided by an agent-
principal model of capital transfers, where both a cooperative and a non-
cooperative equilibrium are possible. A central prediction of that model is
that the aggregate savings and investment responses to alternative forms of
capital inflows are systematically different, depending on whether a coopera-
tive or non-cooperative setting applies. The purpose of this analysis has been
to determine which of the two response patterns best describes the observed
behaviour among developing countries. Our empirical estimations and hy-
pothesis test results suggest that, with some possible exceptions, most
7 Itmay be useful to make a small analytical observation at this point. Throughout the paperwe
have implicitly assumed that each capital recipient country is engaged in either a cooperative or a
non-cooperative relationship with foreign principals, but not both. To model a situation where the
capital recipient is simultaneously involved in cooperative relations with some principals and
non-cooperative ones with others would require various modificationsto the original model, e.g., that
foreign inflows are not perfectly fungible and that foreign principals cannot communicate with each
other. In the present analytical framework, a partly cooperative, partly non-cooperative transfer
solution would not constitute a stable equilibrium.
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developing countries were engaged in a non-cooperative relationship with
foreign suppliers of capital during the period analysed.
The consequence of a non-cooperative equilibrium is that capital recipi-
ents face a trade-off between less income variation and faster growth, when
confronted by the alternative of receiving equity or debt-financed inflows.
Whereas debt-financed transfers exert a relatively stronger positive influence
ondomestic savings andgrowth, equity-financedtransfers providethebenefit
oflower fluctuations in domestic consumption. This means that neitherform
ofcapitalinflow canbejudgedunambiguously superiorto the other, andthus
recommended for all countries, independentofsocial attitudes towards risks.
An unambiguous welfare improvement can only result from a shift ofthis
trade-offtoward less risk and more growth. Howto bring such shifts about is
beyond the scope of this essay. Broadly speaking, this would require some
fundamental institutional changes (e.g., improved information channels, a
better defined and uniform allocation of legal rights, and effective legal
enforcement), especially within many developing countries, to reduce moni-
toring costs and thereby provide a more conducive setting for attaining
cooperative equilibria. Our previous sampie homogeneity test gives a partial
indication that some countries may have evolved further in this regard than
others. Those countries, once identified, can provide suitable examples for
further study and possible emulation.
Appendix
Definition of Variables
The data for the explanatoryvariables, aid, debt, and direct investment, is
taken from OECD, Geographical Distribution 0/ Financial Flows to Devel-
oping Countries.
- Aid consists ofgrants and net official development assistance (ODA) loans
provided by the member countries of the OECD Development Assistance
Committee (DAC), multilateral agencies, and OPEC member countries.
The figures do not include financial flows from the IMF (except loans by
the IMF Trust Fund), member countries of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance, other developing countries, and grants by private
voluntary agencies. Grants cover gifts, in money or in kind, for which no
repaymentis required as weIl as grant-like flows, Le., loans repayable inthe
recipients' currencies. ODA loans carry maturities of over one year and
contain a grant element (a measure of the concessionality of a loan) of at
least25 percent. Officialloanswith a grantelementoflessthan25 percent
appearunderthe heading "otherofficial flows (OOF)" and are classified in
our study as debt-creating financial flows.
- In addition to net OOF, our debtfigures include net private sector flows inTable Al - Economic Growth, Domestic Savings Rate (DSR), Investment Rate (IR), and Foreign Capital Inllows 01 the


















Per capita Real GDP Foreign capital inflows
income growth DSR IR
per cent of GDpb
per capita mill. U.S.$
U.S.$ per cent Debt FDI Aid Debt FDI Aid Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Algeria ...... 1378 5.1 37.8 45.4 8996 75.4 503 9.39 0.079 0.52 10.0
Bangladesh ... 104 3.7 2.4 11.5 50 2.6 3447 0.14 0.007 9.93 10.1
Bolivia* ...... 695 1.1 17.1 18.6 480 10.0 467 3.31 0.069 3.22 6.6
Brazil* ...... 1704 4.1 18.5 24.7 9944 5459.7 410 1.29 0.708 0.05 2.1
Burma ....... 144 3.7 13.0 14.8 245 0.1 810 1.35 0.001 4.47 5.8
Cameroon .... 489 2.3 17.9 20.5 724 9.6 762 4.64 0.062 4.88 9.6
Costa Rica* .. 1538 3.7 13.7 23.5 264 16.4 147 2.03 0.126 1.13 3.3
Dominican
Republic* .. 919 1.8 14.9 21.6 97 1.0 194 0.52 0.005 1.03 1.6
Ecuador* .... 941 3.4 20.5 23.9 827 13.2 245 2.85 0.046 0.85 3.7
Egypt ........ 508 6.8 24.0 25.2 2015 85.4 8130 2.52 0.107 10.16 12.8
EI Salvador ... 695 1.1 18.9 20.1 109 7.2 190 0.93 0.062 1.63 2.6
Greece ...... 3197 3.9 22.2 23.5 1046 199.8 97 0.88 0.168 0.08 1.1
Guatemala ... 851 3.1 15.2 19.6 316 8.5 266 1.38 0.037 1.16 2.6
Guyana* ..... 595 -3.2 11.3 25.7 75 0.1 129 3.93 0.005 6.77 10.7
Haiti ........ 208 3.4 5.1 16.1 31 5.6 345 0.77 . 0.140 8.63 9.5
Honduras* ... 520 4.7 14.1 22.5 138 13.4 286 1.95 0.190 4.05 6.2
Indonesia .... 337 6.0 19.7 20.6 2227 704.6 2540 1.20 0.379 1.37 2.9
Israel ........ 4090 0.4 4.3 25.4 1590 26.2 3525 2.66 0.044 5.89 8.6
Ivory Coast* .. 935 3.2 25.4 26.2 1593 52.2 507 5.70 0.187 1.81 7.7
Kenya ....... 321 3.0 16.9 22.4 973 82.4 923 5.02 0.425 4.76 10.2
Korea, Rep.... 1223 8.6 26.2 28.8 4896 295.8 755 2.72 0.165 0.42 3.3
Mexico* ..... 1578 3.3 20.8 21.3 7157 1704.6 206 1.75 0.418 0.05 2.2
u;Table Al - Economic Growth, Domestic Savings Rate (DSR), Investment Rate (IR), and Foreign Capital Intlows ot the
36 Sample Countries, 1976-1979a
Per capita Real GDP Foreign capital inflows
income growth DSR IR
mill. U.S.$ per cent of GDpb
per capita
.U.S.$ per cent Debt FDI Aid Debt FDI Aid Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Morocco* .... 664 2.3 14.9 27.7 2024 31.1 1385 4.09 0.063 2.80 7.0
Nepal ....... 114 1.4 11.4 n.a. 6 0.7 344 0.09 0.011 5.50 5.6
Nigeria~'c ..... 639 0.2 '27.2 26.3 1335 166.8 166 0.66 0.082 0.08 0.8
Pakistan ~~ .... 218 2.0 11.7 17.1 325 15.1 3053 0.49 0.023 4.58 5.1
Paraguay ..... 872 6.8 17.6 24.7 122 4.7 160 1.25 0.048 1.64 2.9
Peru* ........ 811 -1.6 12.7 14.8 937 596.3 513 1.85 1.174 1.01 4.0
Philippines* .. 513 3.7 24.2 24.6 2386 738.1 886 2.58 0.799 0.96 4.3
Portugal ..... 1820 3.9 9.8 19.6 2253 201.0 208 3.22 0.288 0.30 3.8
Sudan* ...... 394 0.8 8.8 13.7 696 12.1 1479 2.55 0.044 5.41 8.0
Syria, Arab.Rep. 968 0.8 14.8 29.9 186 0.2 3515 0.59 0.001 11.07 11.7
Tanzania ..... 221 2.1 12.3 19.1 375 23.6 1620 2.48 0.156 10.71 13.3
Thailand ..... 486 5.4 20.8 24.4 989 119.1 955 1.15 0.138 1.11 2.4
Uruguay* .... 1784 4.3 11.7 15.7 80 11.2 46 0.39 0.055 0.22 0.7
Zaire* ....... 197 -5.4 9.3 22.2 749 499.3 1188 3.53 2.355 5.60 11.5
a Cois. (1)-(4): unweighte'd averages for the years 1976-1979; cols. (5)-(7): aggregated net financial inflows in the period 1976-1979; cols. (8)-(11):
aggregated financial inflows in percentofaggregated nominal GDPin 1976-1979;for a detailed definition ofvariables and calculation procedures, see
the text. - b Nominal GDPin domestic currency converted to U.S.$ by applying the geriod average exchange rate. - *Indicates countries that entered
into debt renegotiation between 1976-1984. - n.a. = not available
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the form of export credits and portfolio investment (as defined in the
OECD source) from DAC members. Portfolio investment largely corre-
sponds totransactionsbythe private monetary sector (banksectorloans).
Loans bybranches in offshore centres ofbanks resident in DAC countries
areomitted.Theportfolioinvestmentfigure is a directmeasurementofnew
bank transactions with more than one year maturities, less repayments of
principal, converted to V.S. $ at the average annual exchange rate.
- The data on direct investment is from the OECD figures on net private
sector flows from DAC member countries to developing countries.
Table Al presents aid, debt, and direct investment (FDI) both in absolute
amounts for 1976-1979 and as a percentage share of the recipient country's
GDPoverthis period. To calculatethelatterfigures, the developing countries'
nominal GDP (published in IMF, International Financial Statistics) is
converted to V.S.$ by applying annual average exchange rates. Data on the
economic performance variables (apartfrom domestic savings which are not
reported there) are also from International Financial Statistics. Average
annual economic growth rates in 1976-1979 are given by GDP per capita in
constant prices, while investment ratios refer to the average share of gross
fixed capital formation in GDP. Information on gross national savings
(excluding net current transfers from abroad) is from World Bank, World
Tables, and is expressed as a share of GDP, as reported in the same source. It
should be remembered that, within the system ofnational accounts statistics,
gross national savings are calculated as a residual, Le., gross domestic capital
formation minus the current account deficit. However, since our figures for
DSR and IR originate from different sourees, they may not be exactly related
in this indicated manner.
A Mathematical Outline of the Vnderlying Theoretical Models
A two-period Fisherian consumption model is considered, where future
output is a stochastic function of current investment.
(B.1) Qt+I = ~+I F(lt)
Q = aggregate output, I = investment, x = a stochastic variable with mean 1,
distributed according to the probability density function, g(x), over the
non-negative interval (O,x).
The expected social u!ility function to be maximized by the agent is:
(B.2) S = V(Ct) + ß!V(Ct+I)g(x)dx
o
where V' > 0, V" ~ 0 and V(O) = o. We also have that,
Ct = Y+ T - It; Ct+I = Max (V [Xt+I F(lt)-B], 0)
8 The subsequent paragraphs draw heavily on Lächler [1985].648 Ulrich Lächler and Peter Nunnenkamp
y = initial endowment of the agent,
ß = discount term,
T = capital transfer from abroad,
B = the amount owed to the foreign principal in period 2, in return for a
debt transfer in period 1,
V = domestic equityshare (= 1minus the equity share ofnetoutputaccruing
to the foreign principal in return for an equity transfer in period 1).
The present expected value of a combined claim (held by the foreign
principal), involving an amount, B, of debt and (I-V) in foreign equity
participation, canbe expressed, for anygiven level ofinvestmentby the agent,
as
x
(B.3) T = F(I)[1 - Vf (x-b)g(x)dx]
b
where b =B/F(I). In this simplified version of the model, the absence of
"sovereign risk" is assumed.
For a given transfer of size T, the cooperative equilibrium solution is
derived by maximizing S w.r.t. (I,V) or (I,B) subject to (B.3). The non-
cooperative equilibrium solution is derived by maximizing S only w.r.t. I,
given Vand B. The resulting first-order condition, together with (B.3) is then
used to solve for the equilibrium values of (I,V) or (I,B).
A transfer in the form of foreign aid (gifts) can be simply treated as an
increase in y.
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Zusammenfassung: Die Wirkung von ausländischer Kapitalbeteiligung und Kreditfi-
nanzierung aufErsparnisbildung und Wachstum in Entwicklungsländern. - Zur Bewältigung
der internationalen Schuldenprobleme von Entwicklungsländern wird häufig vorgeschlagen,
die Struktur des Kapitalimports zugunsten von Forderungsarten zu verschieben, bei denen
sich die Gläubiger amwirtschaftlichen Risiko beteiligen, wie dies etwabei Direktinvestitionen
der Fall ist. Die Wahl zwischen Kapitalbeteiligung und Kreditfinanzierung mag jedoch
Risiko-Ertrag-Konflikte zwischen Einkommensstabilität und erwartetem wirtschaftlichem
Wachstum involvieren. Diese Hypothese wird aus einem entscheidungstheoretischen Modell
auf der Basis eines Benutzer-Eigentümer Verhältnisses abgeleitet und mittels einer Länder-
querschnittsuntersuchung regressionsanalytisch getestet. Es zeigt sich, daß bei nicht-
kooperativen Beziehungen zwischen Schuldnern und Gläubigern kreditfinanzierte Kapital-
importe einen vergleichsweise starken positiven Einfluß auf die Ersparnisbildung und das650 Ulrich Lächler and Peter Nunnenkamp
Debt versus Equity Inflows
Wirtschaftswachtum im Schuldnerland ausüben. Kapitalbeteiligungen können deshalb nicht
ohne weiteres als vorteilhaft angesehen werden und auch nicht allen Ländern empfohlen
werden, ohne zu bedenken, wie sich soziale Gruppen gegenüber dem Risiko verhalten.
*
Resume: Les effets de l'influx de la dette et du capital propre sur l'epargne et la
croissance en economies developpantes. - L'element commun des beaucoup de propositions
donnees pour faciliter les problemes de la dette exterieure des pays developpants est
l'intention de changer la structure des importations de capital vers l'augmentation du rapport
des creances qui basent sur quelque forme de partager les risques, p.e. la participation en
capital propre. Cependant, le choix entre le capital propre ou des influx des capitauxfinances
par des dettes peut induire un conflit de «rendement-risque» entre la stabilite de revenu et la
croissance attendue. Cette hypothese est derivee d'un modele choix-theorique base sur
l'approche agent-principal et testee empiriquement en appliquant l'analyse de regression
trans-pays. Les auteurs demontrent que, dans un cadre non-cooperatifdes relations debiteur-
crediteur, des transferts finances par des dettes ontune influence plus positive sur l'epargne et
la croissance economique. La participation en capital propre ne peut pas etre evaluee
superieure sans ambigui'te et c'est pourquoi elle ne peut pas etre recommendee pour tous les
pays, independant des attitudes sociales envers le risque.
*
Resumen: EI efecto deI endeudamiento sobre el ahorro yel crecimiento en economfas en
desarrollo comparado con el de las inversiones directas. - En varias propuestas para aliviar el
problema de la deuda externa de los pafses en desarrollo se sugiere alterar la composici6n de
las importaciones de capital en el sentido de aumentar la proporci6n de derechos con
participaci6n en el riesgo econ6mico, es decir, la participaci6n de la inversi6n directa. La
elecci6n entre inversi6n directa y deuda considera la relaci6n inversa riesgo-beneficio que
existe entre la estabilidad deI ingreso y el crecimiento esperado. Esta tesis se deriva de un
modelo te6rico de elecci6n basado en el enfoque agente-principal, que es sometido a un test
empfrico de regresi6n sobre una muestra de pafses. Se muestra que en el marco de relaciones
deudor-acreedor de tipo no cooperativas las transferencias de financiamiento por deuda
ejercen una influencia positiva relativamente superior sobre el ahorro y el crecimiento
econ6mico. La participaci6n directa en el capital no resulta superior en todos casos y por ello
no puede ser recomendada para todos los pafses, independientemente de las actitudes frente
al riesgo que prevalezcan.